




License to Till:  
The Privileges of the Spanish Mesta as a Case of Second Best Institutions
* 
 





The University of British Columbia 
Department of Economics 
997-1873 East Mall 
Vancouver, British Columbia 





The Canadian Institute for Advanced Research 
Program in Institutions, Organizations, and Growth 
 
Abstract: 
The Mesta was the association of the migratory shepherds of Castile, controlling fine 
wool production between the thirteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Its royally granted 
privileges have often been blamed for the stagnant Spanish agricultural productivity 
during the Early Modern period. I argue that the Mesta’s privileges allowed Medieval 
Castile to develop its comparative advantage in wool, and that the Crown was able to 
restrict their scope and application when economic conditions favored arable farming 
interests. I support my argument with extensive archival data, including a new series of 
wool prices and a detailed analysis of lawsuits involving the Mesta. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that institutions are deeply related to economic growth is as old as economics 
itself (appearing conspicuously in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, for example) 
and the recent empirical literature has increasingly focused on institutions as the most 
important determinant of differences in economic performance across countries (Hall and 
Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2005; Rodrik et al. 2004). More subtle is the argument 
that seemingly inefficient institutions might actually improve economic efficiency if 
other distortions are present.
1 This insight follows directly from the theory of the second-
best, which states that in the presence of two or more distortions removing one of them 
will not necessarily improve economic efficiency, and might well reduce it (Rodrik 2004, 
2008).
 
The second-best approach to the effect of institutions on economic efficiency is 
particularly relevant in the Medieval and Early Modern worlds, when the geographical, 
political and technological constraints faced by feudal units and fledgling nation states 
posed formidable challenges to the implementation of arrangements that would have 
guaranteed secure property rights and reduced transaction costs. Markets, for example, 
are usually ranked among the most important institutions in fostering economic 
development; yet an efficient market in land, the most important category of property, 
was nothing less than a chimera in most nations before the nineteenth century. Hence 
institutions that would otherwise hinder the functioning of efficient markets might have 
actually improved the allocation of land resources in their absence. Along similar lines, 
                                                 
1 I define a “seemingly inefficient institution” as one whose first order effect on an otherwise efficient 
economy is negative. 3 
Epstein (2000) and Richardson (2004) argue that Medieval merchant and craft guilds, 
traditionally labeled as distortionary monopolies, are better characterized as cooperative 
institutions with the primary function of organizing economic activity and ensuring the 
preservation and transmission of knowledge. 
The experience of Early Modern Spain has many times been cast in the light of 
institutional analysis, and its failure to keep up with the European economic leaders 
blamed on a flawed array of growth-stifling institutions including the nobility, the 
Catholic Church and the trade guilds. None of them, however, rose quite to the status of 
the Mesta, the national association of migratory shepherds, as the favorite whipping boy 
of those seeking a culprit for the protracted stagnation of the Spanish economy. Echoing 
the sentiment of eighteenth century liberal reformers, early and mid-twentieth century 
scholars blamed the rights of passage granted to migratory shepherding for preventing the 
development of an enclosure movement, and thus forestalling agrarian productivity 
growth; the rental privileges that guaranteed the access of flocks to winter pastures were 
accused of introducing distortions in land markets; and even the export focus of Spanish 
fine wool was singled out as one of the main reasons for the failure of the country to 
industrialize. 
Since the 1970s, a renewed emphasis on Spanish historiography has largely overturned 
the old view of the Mesta. The systematic mining of the archives, most notably by Marín 
Barriguete (1987), has brought to light a wealth of new data on the organization. The case 
that the complex institutional arrangements underpinning the Mesta might have served an 
allocative purpose has been put forward by Nugent and Sanchez (1989), and the different 
institutional mechanisms at the heart of the operations of the Mesta have been described 4 
in detail by a number of authors, especially Phillips and Phillips (1997) and the several 
contributions in Ruíz Martín and García Sanz (1998). While the nature of the intricate 
choreography of shepherds, itinerant judges, towns, landowners, courts and the Crown 
itself has been described in minute detail, a unifying framework of analysis has 
nonetheless remained elusive. 
This paper builds on the existing literature in two dimensions. First, it draws on the 
Spanish historiography and on the recent policy literature to contend that the complex set 
of privileges and organizations linked to the activities of the Mesta are best understood in 
the context of a second-best institutional arrangement. It then uses new price and 
litigation data, together with existing export and licensing series, to provide an empirical 
test for this claim.  
The privileges accorded to the Mesta were a tool that enabled Medieval Castile to realize 
its comparative advantage in fine wool; in the absence of efficient land markets and in 
view of the logistic problems posed by the long migrations, rights of passage and grazing 
allowed the optimal economic activity of migratory shepherding to flourish in what 
would have otherwise been a hostile environment. The Crown, however, could fine-tune 
the level of enforcement of those privileges in order to strike a balance between 
agricultural and shepherding interests, tilting the property rights environment in favor of 
the sector in whose favor the terms of trade were evolving at any given time and 
responding to local political realities. A combination of seemingly inefficient privileges 
and selective enforcement is obviously inferior to a well-functioning market in land and 
in rights of passage. In the absence of such a market, however, this combination can 
easily be construed as a second-best institutional arrangement.  5 
In the period between 1550 and 1600 demand for Mesta wool declined abruptly for 
largely exogenous reasons.
2 This variation makes it possible to identify the response of 
the political variables that determined the enforcement of the Mesta’s privileges. I use a 
new series of fine wool prices deflated by an index of traded goods prices as a measure of 
the comparative advantage of the Mesta’s wool. I then introduce two variables to assess 
the level of enforcement of privileges: appellate lawsuits to which the Mesta was a party 
and licenses to till pasture lands. Both measures show that, as the price of Mesta products 
relative to other traded goods fell, the Crown and the courts increasingly restricted its 
privileges, allowing farming and municipal interests to take over the resources once 
reserved for migratory shepherds. The effects are large, statistically significant, and 
robust to the choice of period and to controlling for the volume of wool exports, for the 
response of the Mesta itself, and for the fiscal situation of the Crown. 
The two new data series presented in this paper contribute to elucidating the economic 
and political environment in which the Mesta operated. The data on fine wool prices are 
the first available for the second half of the sixteenth century, thus extending the existing 
series for over 40 years into the past. I also construct a time series of appellate lawsuits to 
which the Mesta was a party in the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid, and show how 
they can be interpreted as a measure of enforcement of the Mesta’s privileges. 
The evidence presented here cannot ultimately answer the question of whether the 
privileges granted to the Mesta were the most efficient feasible institutional arrangement 
                                                 
2 The main market for the Mesta's wool were the Low Countries. The flare up of the Dutch Revolt and the 
ensuing military hostilities resulted in a breakdown of commerce through the Castilian northern ports. At 
the same time, the emergence of the Nouvelles Draperies, technologically engineered to take advantage of 
British wool, weaned the Flemish and Dutch industries from their dependence of Spanish imports. While 
wool was also exported to France and Italy, the lost northern exports accounted for perhaps half of Castile's 
wool output, thus dealing a major blow to the industry.  6 
to solve the allocative problems faced by agriculture and shepherding in Early Modern 
Spain. It does however show that, through a varying level of privilege enforcement, 
factors of production continued to flow to the sectors where they were most productive 
during the critical Spanish “Golden Century.” 
2. The Mesta and its privileges 
Migratory shepherding, also known as transhumance, has been practiced in most of 
Europe since at least Roman times; its guiding principle is to keep the flocks exposed to 
mild temperatures throughout the year for optimal health and wool quality, which entails 
their spending the summers in the highlands and moving to lower altitude pastures for the 
winters. In most places where transhumance exists sheep are on the move for just a few 
days; Spain is unique in that its sheepwalks extend for up to 800 kilometres, posing 
formidable logistic and political challenges. 
The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 marked the turning point in the Christian 
Reconquista of Arab Spain, substantially reducing the territorial extension of the 
Almohad empire and opening Andalusia to Christian settlement. The Castilian kings 
moved in with their armies but, in what amounted to a veritable frontier movement, 
struggled to repopulate their new dominions.
3 Transhumance could thrive in this 
politically unstable and largely unpopulated landscape. The migratory flocks helped the 
Castilian monarchs to establish a visible presence in their new territories; they 
represented the efficient economic activity in light of the relative abundance of land; and 
they could quickly remove to their highland bases if the military situation turned volatile. 
Migratory shepherds pushing south soon encountered a serious hold up problem. 
                                                 
3 See Bishko (1963) for an economic interpretation of the Reconquista as frontier movement. 7 
Migrating over longer distances required more rest, feeding and watering stops, while the 
lengthening sheepwalks had to cross more bridges and mountain passes; towns along the 
way had strong incentives to act as hold-ups, each trying to extract taxes, tolls, and 
charges for accessing common resources from passing flocks. 
The Honourable Council of the Mesta emerged sometime in the thirteenth century as an 
organized body representing the interests of the northern Castilian migratory shepherds. 
To address the hold up problems faced by its members, the Mesta negotiated directly 
with the Crown, offering tax revenue in exchange for two broadly defined sets of 
privileges. The first one guaranteed free passage through clearly marked “royal 
sheepwalks” and the use of certain commons belonging to towns along those routes. The 
second, eventually consolidated with the emergence of the so-called right of posesión in 
the sixteenth century, consisted of several forms of rent control that sought to guarantee a 
shepherd continuing access to the pastures at stable prices.
4 The enforcement of the 
privileges was removed from the jurisdiction of local justices and placed in the hands of 
itinerant royal judges, the jueces or alcaldes entregadores. The arrangement enabled the 
rapid expansion of transhumant shepherding, an activity in which Spain held a clear 
comparative advantage throughout the Middle Ages, while the Crown obtained a fresh 
tax revenue stream and reaped the political benefits of a stronger presence in southern 
lands. 
                                                 
4 This summary description by no means does justice to the enormous body of privileges accumulated by 
the Mesta over its life, nor to the excruciating detail contained in each of them. Privileges granting access 
to town commons, for example, specified the number of days flocks were allowed to stay in them, which 
sections of a commons they were allowed into, how much wood a shepherd was allow to cut from local 
trees, which watering places the flocks were allowed to use, and so on. Throughout them, pains were taken 
to protect local interests as much as possible while guaranteeing the logistic support for transhumance. The 
definitive collection of Mesta privileges remains Díez Navarro (1731). For an excellent survey and analysis 
of the privileges through time, see García Sanz (1998). 8 
The traditional view of the Mesta as one of the main retardants of Spanish economic 
development contended that its privileges were the result of its own opportunistic rent-
seeking behavior coupled with the Crown’s appetite for revenue at any cost. While the 
privileges might have actually been optimal for the economic conditions of Medieval 
Castile, the argument went, their persistence well into the eighteenth century was at odds 
with the changed economic reality, preventing enclosures, reducing agricultural 
productivity, and generally impeding the development of efficient property rights. Such 
views were born of the political climate of the late eighteenth century, when liberal 
reformers made the abolition of the Mesta the main goal and acid test of their program, 
which nonetheless failed to take root until the 1830s.
5 By focusing on a literal 
interpretation of Mesta privileges, the economic history literature published between the 
1920s and the 1970s picked up a version of the liberal reformers’ portrait; thus Julius 
Klein, in the first scholarly study of the organization, sentenced that the privilege of 
posesión was “one of the larger roots of the evil growth which strangled not only the 
agrarian life of Castile but also the political morale of the country” (Klein 1920, p. 326); 
Vicens Vives (1969, p. 304), in his classic manual of Spanish economic history, 
comments that “instead of waiting for a few years until the development of agriculture 
would bear fruit, the monarchs chose to follow the easy path of their predecessors and 
collect money on something as tangible and easily taxable as sheep;” Elliot (1968, p. 119) 
writes that “the favouring of sheep-farming at the expense of tillage can only appear as a 
                                                 
5 The original public indictment against the Mesta was the report on the proposed reform of agrarian law 
written in 1793 by Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, perhaps the most influential political writer of his time, 
on which many of the original scholarly studies of the Mesta drew upon. In it he denounced “the 
monstrous, unfair and exhorbitant privileges of migratory shepherding,” labeled the Mesta “an offense in 
the eyes of society,” and demanded its prompt abolition. He nonetheless recognized the value of royal 
sheepwalks, recommending that they be preserved under royal tutelage. (Jovellanos 1795, pp.  41-50). 9 
willful sacrifice of Castile’s long-term requirements to considerations of immediate 
convenience”; and North and Thomas (1973, p. 130) conclude that “the decrees favoring 
the Mesta effectively thwarted the development of efficient property rights on land.”  
In the almost nine decades since the publication of Klein’s book, Spanish historiography 
has thoroughly redefined our understanding of the composition of the Mesta, the origin 
and scope of its privileges, and the level of enforcement that the relevant authorities 
accorded them. Bishko (1963) and Pastor de Togneri (1970) shed light on the origins of 
the Mesta in the context of the frontier movement of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
highlighting the contribution of royal protection to the opening of southern pastures and 
the economies of scale that led to highly concentrated shepherding operations. García 
Sanz (1998) presents a fresh view of the evolution of royal privileges throughout the life 
of the Mesta, showing that none of them were absolute in their scope or applicability. 
Both the letter of the law and, more often, the way it was applied, reflected a concern for 
balancing the needs of agricultural interests with transhumant and sedentary shepherding. 
While Mesta flocks were guaranteed passage through municipal lands, for example, there 
were strict regulations in place to prevent them from exacting an undue burden on town 
resources. The right of posesión, one of the most reviled Mesta privileges, seems to have 
been severely limited in its enforcement. Marín Barriguete (1998) documents extensively 
how the mechanisms of rent control were largely ignored by landowners, and how Mesta 
members themselves had few qualms in bidding up the rental price of a field, to the 
detriment of their fellow “brothers,” when grazing lands were scarce. If posesión appears 
as the most conspicuous privilege in the legal code of the Mesta, Marín Barriguete 10 
argues, it is likely because repetitive affirmation was the only, if ineffective, remedy the 
organization found to combat its lack of enforcement.
6 
As the straightforward view of the Mesta and the Crown as a symbiotic rent-seeking duo 
gave way to a much more complex picture, the lack of a theory that could explain the 
rationale for the institutional arrangements governing the allocation of land and the 
relationship between arable farming and husbandry also became evident. In an attempt to 
fill this void, Nugent and Sanchez (1989) suggested that, in the presence of externalities 
created by the high cost of building fences, the Crown might well have acted as a central 
planner, allocating property rights by decree to achieve an efficient distribution of 
resources and taxing away any surplus rents created in the process. In the absence of 
means to prevent sheep from straying into agricultural plots, the argument goes, the 
privileges granted to the Mesta created incentives for plot owners to internalize the 
neighborhood effects. Ekelund et al. (1997) have further noted that any theory of the 
Mesta’s contribution to Spanish economic development must incorporate the role of the 
towns and the courts as independent rent-seeking agents. 
The idea that the Mesta was part of a complex mechanism of property rights’ allocation 
that exhibited at least some desirable features in terms of efficiency has been latent in the 
historiographical literature in more or less explicit form, emerging in discussions ranging 
from the flexibility of the apparently rigid legal framework to the ecological virtues of 
                                                 
6 See also Phillips and Phillips (1997, p. 58). In a private communication Enrique Llopis Agelán mentioned 
that, as late as the eighteenth century, sales of grazing fields mentioned whether the plots were encumbered 
by posesión or not. It is thus possible that some level of enforcement persisted. The definitive test to 
elucidate the matter would be to compare sale prices of plots with and without posesión, something that my 
data do not allow for. 11 
transhumance within the Iberian geography.
7 Nugent and Sanchez’s formulation has the 
virtue of being quite explicit and specific, but it lacks a direct empirical test and relies on 
the debatable assumptions that it was costly to exclude animals from entering specific 
plots and that most plots would have been small enough for exclusion to be a concern.
8 
Marín Barriguete (1987) conclusively shows that the enforcement of Mesta privileges 
was imperfect, and delineates the main temporal patterns in the evolution of property 
rights; García Sanz (1998) restates these findings, analyzing individual privileges and 
discussing their level of enforcement in detail. These works pave the way to formulate a 
theoretical framework that can help to understand the forces driving enforcement levels, 
as well as their efficiency and allocative consequences. 
3. Second-best institutions 
Since its formulation by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), the theory of the second best has 
been a mainstay of economic analysis. While it would seem natural to extend its insights 
into the field of institutional analysis, the only general attempt to do so have been two 
recent policy contributions by Rodrik (2004, 2008). A number of studies exhibit features 
that resemble second best institutions. In Acemoglu et al. (2006), for example, countries 
that are away from the technology frontier benefit more from capital investment rather 
than from research and development. In this case, institutions that generate economic 
rents, usually suboptimal, are a second best solution in that they make resources for 
                                                 
7 On the adaptability of migratory shepherding to the Iberian landscape see Cabo Alonso (1998). 
8 The Nugent and Sanchez model hinges on the existence of negative neighborhood effects arising from 
grazing sheep next to farmed plots. While perhaps a valid concern within a village terminus, there was 
certainly no such problem in the winter pastures, which consisted of vast ranges dedicated exclusively to 
grazing and were occupied by very large flocks. The argument also rests on the excessive cost of building 
fences because of the chronic shortage of wood in Castile; stone fences, however, are common in the 
Spanish landscape. If they were not built, it was likely as the result of legal restrictions, or because there 
was little need for them.  12 
investment available. Qian (2003) interprets Chinese economic growth as an application 
of non-standard institutions that allowed the economy to develop while maintaining the 
rents of the elite. Acemoglu (2006) provides a general model of inefficient institutions 
and finds that, in the special case when commitment or hold-up problems exist, these 
inefficient institutions can be useful to protect the rights of specific groups in the 
economy. This latter case seems quite germane to that of the Mesta, whose activities 
would have been held-up by towns in the absence of apparently inefficient privileges. 
Introducing a general theory of second-best institutions is beyond the scope of this study. 
To proceed, it is only necessary to define them precisely. I shall follow the lead of Rodrik 
(2008) in defining second-best institutions as those that relax the binding constraint on 
economic growth while being compatible with the political and economic environment. 
Best-practice policy would have counseled the creation of a free market in land in early 
modern Castile. I shall argue that hold-up problems and political realities made this 
infeasible, and that the legal privileges granted to the Mesta combined with variable 
enforcement levels constituted the best attainable solution at the time.  
By the very nature of second-best arguments, it would be possible to build many 
frameworks in which, given some form of market failure, an externally introduced 
distortion raises the level of efficiency. As an example, and in line with the suggestion of 
Ekelund et al. (1997), one could envision a lobbying framework à la Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), in which both towns and Mesta offered payments to the Crown in 
exchange for property rights protection. The evolution of their relative contributive 
capacities through time would determine the level of property rights enforcement; if 
contributive capacity were related to the marginal productivity of land in the hands of 13 
each player, the eventual allocation, while wasteful from a first-best perspective, would 
still reflect a measure of efficiency. This type of theoretical exercise, however, seems 
moot without establishing first that the evolution of property rights over time did in fact 
respond to, or at least move in a direction consistent with, the efficient allocation of 
resources. The rest of the paper shows that this was indeed the case during the second 
half of the sixteenth century, a period in which, owing to the decline in international 
demand for fine wool and increasing population pressure in Castile, the friction between 
shepherding and agricultural interests was most intense. 
4. The wool trade in the second half of the sixteenth century 
One of the main hurdles in studying the decline of the wool industry in the sixteenth 
century is the dearth of price data for any type of Spanish wool or woolen products, either 
in Spain or in its export markets. Phillips and Phillips (1997) have collected the few 
available series of early modern wool prices in Spain and abroad; while from 1600 on 
some reasonably continuous series of varying quality exist, only a few scattered 
observations are available for the sixteenth century. This section presents a new series 
collected from the account books of the Hospital de la Misericordia in Seville covering 
the period 1568 – 1603, and discusses its usefulness to assess the evolution of the market 
for Spanish wool. 
Among its many functions to which the modern meaning of “hospital” does not do 
justice, the Misericordia was charged with providing the trousseaux that nuns were given 
during the Holy Week of the year they took their first vows.
9 In order to assemble an 
                                                 
9 A word now superseded by the times, the trousseau was a collection of fine linens and personal clothing 
items a bride took into her matrimony. Nuns, as brides of God, were given trousseaux containing fine 
clothing, blankets, mantelpieces and curtains to take with them into their new convent life. 14 
average of 120 trousseaux per year, the hospital purchased large quantities of fine 
unwashed wool during the summer of the previous year (after the late spring shearing 
was over), paid for its washing and processing, and used it to manufacture the clothing 
items to be delivered the following spring. The quantity and price of each wool purchase 
was duly recorded in the account books by the mayordomo; many times, the name of the 
merchant from whom the wool was purchased was recorded as well. Table 1 reports the 
yearly quantities purchased by the hospital in arrobas (roughly 11.5 kilograms) as well as 
the average yearly unit prices, constructed by weighting the unit prices of each 
transaction by the quantities purchased.
10 The account books from three years are missing 
(1567, 1570 and 1574), and in 1601 and 1602 the hospital purchased wool already 
washed and bleached, the prices of which are not comparable to the rest of the series.
11 
                                                 
10 Wool was purchased by volume rather than by weight. Domestic transactions were conducted in arrobas 
– a measure of volume – while exports were denominated in sacks. This makes it difficult to provide 
precise weight estimates for the Misericordia purchases. The definition of the relevant measures varied by 
localities, while compression and moisture could also affect the weight of a specific volume of wool.  
11 The complete list of transactions, together with the rest of the data series presented in this paper, are 
available at http://mauricio.econ.ubc.ca/data/Mesta_data.xls 15 
Table 1: Wool prices and quantities purchased by the Hospital de la 
Misericordia in Seville, 1558-1604 
Year  Quantity   
(arrobas) 
Unit price    
(maravedíes)     Year  Quantity   
(arrobas) 
Unit price    
(maravedíes) 
1558  626  194    1582  92  289 
1559  522  238    1583  729  255 
1560  615  249    1584  748  263 
1561  743  304    1585  940  289 
1562  621  332    1586  946  336 
1563  889  309    1587  843  311 
1564  752  376    1588  792  318 
1565  848  413    1589  672  261 
1566  1200  394    1590  1449  225 
1567        1591  567  255 
1568  1008  255    1592  896  273 
1569  876  276    1593  1328  263 
1570        1594  631  263 
1571  318  301    1595  741  289 
1572  714  364    1596  877  306 
1573  636  376    1597  400  327 
1574        1598  612  310 
1575  694  400    1599  934  298 
1576  1042  335    1600  510  297 
1577  1191  268    1601     
1578  376  289    1602     
1579  715  280    1603  414  366 
1580  783  321    1604  392  374 
1581  906  316             
Source: Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, Misericordia, Libros 108 – 114 
The data from the Hospital de la Misericordia have several desirable properties. The 
prices are for unwashed wool, as it was shorn from the sheep, guaranteeing that no 
processing costs have crept into the series.
12 The average transaction was large (a little 
over 200 arrobas, or 2,300 kilograms), reducing the impact of intermediation costs. Wool 
was purchased from many different merchants who had little or no repeat business over 
time, reducing the possibility of corruption. All transactions were grouped in the same 
period every year, eliminating seasonality concerns. While the origin and quality of the 
                                                 
12 Wool exports were also sold unwashed, as leaving the grease on the fibers contributed to preserving the 
qualities of the wool until it could be processed.   16 
wool is not reported in the books, its use in manufacturing fine clothing (suitable for the 
‘wedding’ of the well-to-do women taking up monastic vows) required that its quality be 
fairly high; and since it was purchased for the exact same purpose every year, it is also 
likely that the quality did not vary much over time. Even if this particular wool did not 
come from transhumant flocks, it would have had to be a close substitute, at the very least 
from sedentary merino flocks. These sedentary flocks were under the jurisdiction of the 
Mesta until 1603, and the price of their wool would have fluctuated closely with that of 
export varieties, particularly in times of depressed international demand.
13 
Since the Misericordia books come to an end in 1604, providing a longer-run picture 
requires splicing the series to one of the existing data sources. The leading candidate is 
the wool price series reported in Hamilton (1934), also derived from hospital sources. 
Hamilton’s series, however, presents several problems. Its yearly prices are a simple 
average of the first three transactions he found for each quarter (a total 12 observations 
per year) across a range of institutions, without adjusting for the quantity purchased and 
without any attempt to discriminate across wool qualities. This introduces, first, an 
element of seasonality; presumably the summer purchases would have been much larger 
than those in other seasons, and hence the yearly prices reported, being a simple average, 
would show an abnormally large influence from off-season observations. Second, if the 
first three purchases in different quarters or different years happened to come from 
different institutions, there is no guarantee that they would refer to the same wool 
qualities. Finally, Hamilton did not report whether his prices were for washed wool, 
unwashed wool, or both; since at the Misericordia wool was purchased in both forms 
                                                 
13 Phillips and Phillips (1997, p. 63). 17 
(with washed wool purchases concentrated late in the year), it is quite likely that 
Hamilton’s prices are contaminated by some washed wool quotes. Unfortunately, neither 
Hamilton’s published series nor his worksheets provide enough information to 
reconstruct his series from original archival documents.
14 
The squares in Figure 1 represent the Misericordia prices, while the triangles are 
Hamilton’s series; the latter is clearly more volatile, quite possibly as a consequence of 
the problems discussed above. Since Hamilton’s data start in 1601 the two sources 
overlap for just two data points, making it impossible to check the consistency of the 
spliced series. While the levels at the splicing point are remarkably similar, the results 
must nonetheless be used with a measure of caution.  
Assessing the evolution of the price of any good in an age of inflation requires choosing a 
deflator carefully. Since Hamilton's pioneering effort, the Spanish historical economics 
literature has produced an abundance of price indices for several Spanish regions. For the 
purposes of this exercise, I will rely on the indices presented in Drelichman (2005). These 
indices have three key advantages: 1) they are calculated separately for traded and non-
traded goods; 2) the baskets used to compute them are entirely derived from primary 
sources; 3) they are available for four different Spanish regions.
15 
Iberian good markets were not integrated, and hence the region for which the price index 
is calculated matters. The availability of price data also varies widely from region to 
                                                 
14 Hamilton’s worksheets are housed at the Duke University Rare Book, Manuscript and Special 
Collections Library. Their series is not complete, and the archival sources for individual goods are not 
noted. 
15 For a thorough discussion on the construction of these price indices, as well as for a survey of other 
series, see Drelichman (2005). The indices can be downloaded from 
http://mauricio.econ.ubc.ca/data/Price_Indices_Moctezuma.xls 18 
region, resulting in discrepancies in the quality of the indices. These factors conspire to 
create a difficult choice. The source of the wool prices was in Seville, and would hence 
suggest the use of Andalusian prices. The Andalusian price series, however, is also the 
one that exhibits the largest proportion of missing data, and hence the greatest volatility. 
Excess volatility should introduce attenuation bias, and therefore work against finding 
significant results. Because this biases the results against my argument, I shall use 
Andalusian prices. In Appendix C, I repeat the entire econometric analysis using an Old 
Castilian deflator for robustness. The results, as expected, improve slightly. 
The second choice is whether to use an index of traded goods, non-traded goods, or a 
consumer price index. The relevant variable for this study is the competitiveness of Mesta 
wool relative to the goods that represented the next best use of the land on which Mesta 
sheep grazed. The alternative uses of the Mesta's pastures were growing crops or raising 
cattle for meat. Crops were mostly traded goods, while meat was non-traded.
16 Marín 
Barriguete's (1987) account of the violation of Mesta privileges suggests that the 
overwhelming reason why Mesta flocks were challenged and evicted from pastures was 
to grow crops. The granting of licenses to till, discussed below, suggests as much. This is 
consistent with the general trend of the onsetting Castilian economic crisis, as in times of 
difficulty people substitute the consumption of expensive animal protein for cheaper 
plant calories.
17 I hence use a traded goods price index as a deflator. For robustness 
                                                 
16 In the international trade literature, a traded good is one that has the potential to be traded across 
international borders given the current state of technology. Essentially what matters to determine tradability 
is that the price of a good responds to developments in international markets. In early modern Spain most 
crops were, by this definition, traded goods. See Drelichman (2005) for a full discussion on this issue. 
17 An additional reason to convert acreage to farmland rather than cattle grazing is that the downsizing of 
Mesta flocks generated a steady supply of mutton in the last decades of the sixteenth century, keeping its 
prices low (Ringrose 1983, p. 265). Because mutton is a non-traded good, this does not affect the use of the 
wool prices deflated by a traded goods index as a measure of the comparative advantage of wool. Selling 19 
purposes, Appendix C repeats the econometric analysis using a non-traded goods index 
with little variation in the results. Since a consumer price index will by construction be a 
weighted average of the traded and non-traded goods indices, I do not use one in the 
sensitivity analysis. 
Figure 1: Wool prices, 1558 – 1650, in constant 1601-1610 maravedíes. 
 
Sources: Table 1; Hamilton (1934, appendix V); Drelichman (2005). 
Figure 1 presents the spliced series deflated by an index of Andalusian traded goods 
prices, together with a 5-year moving average trend. As discussed above, the choice of 
deflator allows the interpretations of the series as a measure of the comparative advantage 
                                                 
mutton does not seem to have been profitable in itself for Mesta members. Philips and Philips (1997, p. 
121) argue that, in normal economic times, sheep were culled only when they became too old to graze 
properly and hence produce a good quality fleece. In other words, the complementarity in production 
between wool and mutton would not have affected decisions on the size of flocks or use of pasture land at 
the margin. 20 
of wool relative to other traded products.
18  Deflating the series by an index of traded 
goods also isolates it from the “Dutch Disease” effect Spain was experiencing as a 
consequence of the remittances of American treasure; since Dutch Disease implies a rise 
in the relative price of non-traded goods, not controlling for it would result in a larger 
observed fall of the price of traded goods such as wool, biasing the results downwards 
(and in favor of my argument).
19 
The Misericordia prices bring new meaning to the decline in the fine wool industry in the 
late sixteenth century, so far described only through the exports of the northern ports 
(Casado Alonso, 1994; Grafe, 2001; Bilbao, 2003), the records of maritime insurers 
(Phillips and Phillips, 1997) or animal head counts for tax purposes (Le Flem, 1972). 
Wool prices fell by roughly 50% in real terms between 1565 and 1590, and, if Hamilton’s 
data are accurate, did not recover until the 1620s. 
5. The enforcement of Mesta privileges 
The eighteenth century liberal indictment of the Mesta, and later the traditional 
historiography, pointed to the enormous body of privileges and their periodic 
confirmation as evidence of the association’s influence over the monarchy and its 
negative effects on the Castilian economy. In pre-modern times, however, written laws 
and privileges often did not reflect the realities on the ground (Greif, 2006; Drelichman, 
2007). Quite to the contrary, as Marín Barriguete (1987) argues, the Mesta’s efforts to 
                                                 
18 The concept of comparative advantage used in this paper is a relative one. While in a two-sector model 
one good will have a comparative advantage and the other will not, in a multi-sector trade model there will 
be an ordering of goods depending on their equivalent cost of production relative to import varieties. 
Therefore, the expression “a decline in the comparative advantage of wool relative to agricultural products” 
does not necessary mean that wool became imported and agricultural products exported. It rather implies 
that, because the relative cost advantage of wool with respect to other products has declined, optimality 
requires that some land allocated to pasture be shifted to agriculture. 
19 A discussion of Dutch Disease in sixteenth-century Spain can be found in Drelichman (2005). 21 
have its privileges confirmed and reconfirmed by successive monarchs suggest that they 
were widely ignored. In this section I present three different measures of the enforcement 
of the privileges of the Mesta. The first two series, licenses to till granted by the Crown 
and the rulings of itinerant judges, are from Marín Barriguete’s (1987) doctoral 
dissertation, which surveyed the holdings of the Mesta’s own archive.
20 The third one, a 
series of appellate lawsuits against the Mesta in the Royal Chancery Court, is constructed 
directly from the primary source. 
Licenses to till 
Towns or individual landowners could apply to the Crown for licenses to till pastures that 
would have normally been reserved for Mesta flocks. Such applications were normally 
made on the grounds that the town needed the income to defray specific expenses, most 
often royal taxes. Marín Barriguete (1987, pp. 1440-1484) shows that licensing took 
place all over Castile. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence provided by Phillips 
and Phillips (1997, p. 62). The licenses were granted for limited periods, normally five or 
six years, although Marín Barriguete (1987, p. 476) argues that licensees rarely devolved 
the land to pasture once the license expired. While we do not have any hard information 
about the size of parcels affected by the licenses, the fact that most applicants were towns 
and ecclesiastical institutions supports the speculation that the newly tilled fields would 
have covered medium to large extensions. 
Direct revenue from granting licenses was likely not a factor in the Crown's decision 
making. The literature and the archival record do not mention the cost of licenses, and no 
                                                 
20 The archive of the Mesta is now housed at the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid. Marín Barriguete’s 
work was the first thorough survey of its holdings, and has served as the basis of the subsequent catalogue. 22 
revenue from license granting shows up in the Crown's fiscal accounts. This suggests that 
the future revenue streams from property rights allocation, together with political 
considerations, were more important than an immediate financial gain from privilege 
sales. In pondering whether to grant tillage licenses, the Crown was faced with a very 
direct trade-off. If the towns’ pleas of poverty were founded, refusing their applications 
would likely have compromised the royal revenue streams derived from them. If local 
food shortages were behind the requests for licenses, denying them would have sparked 
social unrest. Granting the applications, on the other hand, would have eroded the 
privileges of the Mesta and reduced the revenues derived from it. The mere fact that 
licenses were granted demonstrates once again that the Mesta’s privileges were not all 
encompassing. Their erosion at the hands of arable interests shows that the Crown 
prioritized other issues, be it sources of revenue or social peace, over taxes paid by 
migrating flocks. Figure 2 plots the yearly number of licenses granted to towns or 
individual plot owners to till pastures on which the Mesta held grazing rights between 
1550 and 1600; unfortunately, no data are available for the seventeenth century.  23 
Figure 2: Licenses to till pastures 
 
Source: Marín Barriguete (1987, pp. 1400-1484). The value for the year 1591, not plotted to 
preserve a convenient scale, is 134. 
The series closely reflects the evolution of the fiscal pressure exerted by the Crown over 
Castilian municipalities. In 1576 the Crown obtained a large increase in sales taxes, the 
alcabalas, which were apportioned among towns; starting in that very year, licenses 
jumped from their long run average of about five per year to almost thirty per year. The 
next fiscal shock came in the wake of the destruction of the Invincible Armada in 1588 
and the subsequent threat of British invasion. The year 1591 saw the introduction of the 
millones excises, which fell squarely on Castilian municipalities. The number of licenses 
skyrocketed to 134, and, while retreating from their peak, stayed high for the next three 
years. Marín Barriguete (1987, p. 482) argues that the increase in their numbers was a 
clear sign of the withdrawal of the Crown’s support for the Mesta in favor of the cities. 24 
The evidence presented in this section also shows that their variation was linked to fiscal 
events, rising each time the tax burden on cities increased.  
The rulings of itinerant judges as a measure of the Mesta’s response 
The solution to the hold up problems faced by the Mesta in the Middle Ages included the 
creation of a new category of itinerant royal judges, the jueces entregadores, who, 
starting in the late thirteenth century, were given exclusive jurisdiction over any civil 
complaint related to the activities of the Mesta and its members. Local justices and their 
bias towards arable farming interests were hence removed from the adjudication of 
disputes and, in principle, both shepherds and farmers were provided with a fair 
mechanism to resolve their complaints. This special jurisdiction grew more complicated 
over time, as the Crown sold the office of chief itinerant judge (alcalde mayor 
entregador) to a noble family and with it the power to appoint itinerant judges to hear 
certain types of disputes, such as examining the boundaries of sheepwalks; the Mesta 
itself eventually bought the office in 1568. While the Crown continued to appoint 
itinerant judges with broad competencies over most disputes, the incentives of 
entregadores, who were entitled to keep a portion of the fines they levied, were to always 
rule against farmers and towns. Their mode of operation consisted in verifying the 
complaints of Mesta members and levying the appropriate fines. I shall therefore use the 
rulings of entregadores as a measure of the vigor with which the Mesta tried to enforce 
its own privileges.
21 Figure 3 presents their evolution between 1520 and 1650. The data 
are reported in five-year intervals in the original source. 
                                                 
21 The standard account of the origins and evolution of the entregadores remains Klein (1920), pp. 67-85. 
Marín Barriguete (1987) surveys the lawsuits heard by entregadores in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in minute detail. 25 
Figure 3: Rulings of alcaldes entregadores per five year period, 1520 – 1650 
 
Source: Marín Barriguete (1987, pp. 1324-1328). 
The activity of entregadores experienced a marked increase between 1590 and 1610, just 
as wool prices were reaching their nadir. The period also coincides with the spike in royal 
licenses to till pastures granted in the wake of the millones, and with the downturn in 
Castilian agricultural production. The Mesta clearly refused to go down without a fight. 
The tools at its disposal, however, were to prove inadequate. Because the fines that 
entregadores could levy for different types of offences were fixed by a royal decree that 
had not been updated since 1554, their value was rapidly eroding in the inflationary 
context of the late sixteenth century.
22 Since the frequency of itinerant judge visits was 
low, many towns and landowners found it advantageous to just pay the fines and keep 
infringing the privileges until the next visit. Farmers essentially considered the fines as 
                                                 
22 Based on the price indices from Drelichman (2005), in the second half of the sixteenth century the price 
index rose by 132% in Old Castile and by 103% in Andalusia. 26 
part of the cost of doing business.
23 The Mesta continued to issue rulings not because of 
the small monetary benefit it derived from them, but as an attempt to reverse the erosion 
in its property rights. Because of its limited resources, the Mesta chose to concentrate its 
enforcement efforts on specific areas and offences, issuing repeated rulings to try to 
subdue landowners and farmers into compliance (Phillips and Phillips 1997, p. 58). The 
rulings of entregadores, however, could be appealed to the Royal Chancery Courts, key 
institutions in the design and implementation of royal policy. 
Appellate lawsuits 
The two Royal Chancery Courts sat in Valladolid and Granada, and had jurisdiction over 
the Castilian territories north and south of the river Tagus respectively. Since they did not 
have direct financial or political interests in the outcome of the cases and their members 
could be appointed or dismissed at will by the king, the Chancery courts provide a good 
gauge for Royal support of Mesta privileges.  
While in a contemporary legal mindset written law is usually considered authoritative, 
and a reversal of a lower court decision must be based on a reexamination of the facts or 
on a different interpretation of the law, Early Modern legal practice in Castile took a 
much more flexible approach. Judges did not have to justify their rulings in writing, and 
wide departures from statutory law were not uncommon if the court felt that justice so 
required it. Consider the following excerpts from a sentence in a case involving the Mesta 
and the town of Gormaz in 1591: 
We rule that Diego Montero, chief judge entregador of the Council of the 
Mesta, who heard this lawsuit […] in which he sentenced the town of 
                                                 
23 See Marín Barriguete (1987, p. 191). 27 
Gormaz to observe the privileges of the said council of the Mesta […] 
judged and pronounced fairly, and hence we must confirm and do confirm 
his judgment. 
We further revoke the parts of the said sentence in which he sentenced the 
town of Gormaz not to enclose the fields, meadows and pastures it used to 
enclose, and hereby hold it nullified. And we further serve justice by 
ordering that the sheep of the Mesta be barred from entry into the fields 
that the said town of Gormaz has enclosed, and that the brothers of the 
Mesta be prevented from entering in them, and that if either them or their 
sheep should enter, they be held liable and pay the damage caused. 
And we further order any and all monies that may have been taken from 
the said town of Gormaz as a consequence of the said sentence be 
returned to the said town of Gormaz free and without any cost. 
ARChV. Pleitos Civiles. Pérez Alonso (F). 1395.0004 
After paying lip service to Mesta privileges in the first paragraph, the Chancery Court 
proceeded to reverse the ruling of the entregador, in complete contradiction of the rights 
of passage and pasturage protected in those privileges. As customary, no specific grounds 
were given for the ruling other than “serving justice.” 
Using litigation records requires first assessing the holdings of the relevant archives to 
determine how complete they are and, in the case of significant missing data, how 
representative the remaining material might be. The records of the Granada court were 
not centralized in an archive until three decades after its closure in the 1830s, resulting in 
serious losses of material; the holdings of the present-day archive are furthermore poorly 
described, making it impossible to reconstruct a global view of Mesta-related litigation in 
southern Castile. The Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid, in contrast, 
was created in 1600 and has operated continuously since, preserving the files of most of 
the cases heard there. The records of two of its eight civil chambers are fully catalogued 
and described; since cases reaching the court on appeal were randomly assigned to the 
different civil chambers, the described files constitute a clean 25% random sample of the 28 
surviving appellate cases.
24 While there is no way to ascertain how many files have been 
lost from the civil chambers, or whether the process was random, I have been able to 
establish that losses of nobility files at the Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of 
Valladolid did not exceed 10% of the cases, and that they followed a random pattern; 
since nobility and civil cases are physically identical, there is no reason to assume that 
losses of civil files would have followed a different process.
25 
The impossibility of relying on the Granada files raises a concern, since most of the 
southern pastures fell within its jurisdiction. However, the jurisdiction of the Valladolid 
Chancery Court encompassed all the northern bases of the transhumant flocks, all of the 
mountain passes between Old and New Castile, and the parts of the pasture-rich region of 
Extremadura north of the river Tagus. This geographical coverage provides an insight 
into all the activities of the Mesta flocks. 
Figure 4 presents the number of lawsuits to which the Mesta or one of its members were 
a party in the two described civil chambers during the life of the Royal Chancery Court (a 
straightforward estimate for all eight chambers can be obtained by multiplying all values 
by four).  
                                                 
24 The standard reference on the history of the Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid is Martín 
Postigo (1979). The random procedure to allocate cases to the different civil chambers is described in 
Aulestia (1667), itself an operational manual of the court. The catalogued escribanías (secretariats), which 
bore a one to one correspondence to the civil chambers, are those known by the names of Fernando Alonso 
and Pérez Alonso, the last secretaries to hold the respective offices. 
25 The cases heard by the nobility chamber, the Sala de Hijosdalgo, are the primary attraction of the 
Archive today, and hence their history is much better documented than that of the civil cases. The 
procedure I used to determine that the files missing from the Sala de Hijosdalgo followed essentially a 
random pattern is described in Drelichman (2007). 29 
Figure 4: Number of lawsuits to which the Mesta or one of its members were a party, per 
decade, in two out of eight civil chambers at the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid 
 
Source: Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid. 
The bulk of legal activity was concentrated in the decades between 1570 and 1620, with 
very few cases reaching the Chancery Court in other periods. I studied in detail a random 
sample of 10% of the described cases; all of them had been originally decided in favor of 
the Mesta by the entregadores, and hence were being appealed by towns or landowners.
26 
On appeal, the Mesta won slightly over 25% of the cases and lost the rest, regardless of 
historical period. 
Litigating in Royal Chancery Court was expensive; a landowner or a town appealing the 
ruling of an entregador would have had to retain attorneys in Valladolid or Granada, pay 
                                                 
26 The random sample was drawn from the entire population of cases without stratifying by year. Since 
many years had less than 10 cases, stratifying by year would have resulted in many of them having no 
chance of being represented in the sample. The online data file details the number of cases drawn from each 
time period. 30 
an always-increasing number of court and secretarial fees, and be prepared to endure 
stalling tactics that could sometimes drag on for years.
27 Landowners and towns would 
not have appealed the decisions of entregadores if they had not faced substantial odds of 
winning.
28 As royal courts became more favorable to municipal and landed interests the 
monetary stakes necessary to take a case to Valladolid or Granada would have gone 
down, and an increasing number of entregador decisions would have been appealed. 
The increase in litigation shown in Figure 4 coupled with a constant ex-post win rate is 
consistent what would be expected following an increase in the friendliness of the courts 
towards local interests. On cases of equivalent merits, courts would have been more 
inclined to rule in favor of farmers and towns, thus increasing their win rates; however, 
this increased friendliness would have attracted more appellants whose cases had lesser 
merits and would have been more likely to be rejected, thus reducing win rates. Appendix 
B formally demonstrates how, under very general assumptions, the two effects can be 
strong enough to offset each other, yielding an ambiguous impact on the overall ex-post 
win rate. 
A potential obstacle in considering the series of appellate lawsuits as an independent 
measure of enforcement is that they could be merely a reflection of entregador rulings. 
This concern is easily evaluated by plotting the two series on the same chart, which I do 
in Figure 5 after converting the appellate lawsuit data to match the time scale of 
entregador rulings. 
                                                 
27 A thorough account of Castilian civil litigation can be found in Kagan (1981). 
28 This argument is also made in Phillips and Phillips (1997, p. 58).  31 
Figure 5: Original and appellate lawsuits 
 
Source: Marín Barriguete (1987, pp. 1324-1328); Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid. 
If the only reason for the increase in appellate lawsuits were a higher number of 
entregador rulings, one would expect the former series to trail the latter. Figure 5 shows 
that exactly the opposite phenomenon was taking place; appellate lawsuits were leading, 
rather than trailing, entregador rulings. More formally, Table 2 regresses appellate 
lawsuits on current and lagged values of entregador rulings, as well as on a five year 
trailing moving average. None of the coefficients are significant at the 10% level, 
indicating that rulings have no predictive power for appellate lawsuits. 
 32 
Table 2: Regression models of entregador 




(1)  (2) 
rulings  0.19 
(0.89)   
L1_rulings  0.05 
(0.14)   
L2_rulings  0.24 
(0.54)   
L3_rulings  -0.81 
(-1.44)   
L4_rulings  0.32 
(0.97)   










     
Prob > F  0.03  0.99 
R
2  0.16  0.00 
DW  1.65  1.35 
N  39  39 
OLS regressions with Newey-West standard errors; t-
statistics in parenthesis. LX represents a variable lagged 
X years. 
Figure 5 seems to suggest that appellate lawsuits might predict rulings. A linear 
regression of rulings on current and lagged values of appellate lawsuits shows strong 
evidence of serial correlation, with a Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.43, requiring a 
correction using the Cochrane-Orcutt method. Both the regression with four lags and the 
one with the five year moving average fail to produce maximum likelihood convergence; 
a regression with three lags, however, succeeds in eliminating serial correlation. The 
result is reported in Table 3. 33 






aplawsuits  -0.19 
(-0.91) 
L1_aplawsuits  0.61* 
(1.95) 
L2_aplawsuits  -0.03 
(-0.09) 
L3_aplawsuits  -0.41 
(-1.52) 
constant  3.40 
(3.18) 
   
Prob > F  0.00 
R
2  0.09 
DW  2.19 
N  40 
Cochrane-Orcutt regression with robust standard errors; 
t-statistics in parenthesis. LX represents a variable 
lagged X years. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. 
Only the first lag of appellate lawsuits seems to come close to any standard level of 
significance, indicating that appellate lawsuits may hold at best some weak predictive 
power in explaining entregador rulings. The overall explanatory power of the regression 
remains very low, suggesting that appellate lawsuits were not a major factor in explaining 
rulings. This seems consistent with Phillips and Phillips’ interpretation that entregador 
rulings, while still displaying a measure of reaction to royal policy, were strategically 
concentrated in those areas in which they could have maximum impact.
29 
6. Political responses to market conditions 
As shown in the previous section, lawsuits in the Royal Chancery Courts and licenses to 
till pasture lands can be considered measures of the enforcement of the privileges granted 
                                                 
29 For example, between 1580 and 1600, the Mesta concentrated on fighting encroachment on its winter 
pastures while giving up altogether on other infringements. See Phillips and Phillips (1997, p. 58). 34 
to the Mesta. While these two instruments ultimately emanated from the Royal 
administrative apparatus, the separation between the court system and the fiscal organs of 
the Crown was sufficiently large to warrant treating them as independent measures in 
principle. It remains to explore what determined that level of enforcement. I do not 
dispute the claim found in the traditional literature that fiscal considerations were 
paramount in determining the allocation of property rights. Rather, I argue that this 
allocation did not need to be myopic to market conditions or political realities on the 
ground. 
I discuss two complementary reasons behind the shift in the enforcement of Mesta 
privileges. The first one is fiscal. A sovereign wanting to maximize revenue might well 
have been best served by favoring those sectors with the capability of generating the 
largest profits, and then taxing them as necessary. As external demand for Mesta wool 
plummeted starting in the late 1560s, so did the protections the political system was 
willing to accord transhumant shepherds. The beneficiaries were Castilian farmers and 
towns, the relative price of whose products had increased vis-à-vis wool, and who had 
always provided the bulk of the fiscal resources that financed the expansion of the 
Spanish empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
30 
A second force behind the shift in royal policy was almost certainly the changing 
agricultural situation of the late sixteenth century. Evidence from regional tithe series 
shows that Castilian agricultural output reached a peak in the 1580s.
31 After that, both 
                                                 
30 See, among many others, Ulloa (1977), Artola (1982), Thompson (1994), Yun Casalilla (2004). 
31 See, for example, Díez Sanz (1995, p. 307), for Soria; García Sanz (1994, pp. 18-19) for Toledo and 
Segovia; García Sanz (1977, pp. 94-130) for an extended analysis of Segovia; and Marcos Martín (2000, 
pp. 350-356) for a general treatment.  35 
output and productivity declined, and agricultural techniques gradually shifted from 
intensive to extensive farming. In the last years of the century, a series of poor harvests 
resulted in local food shortages. The drop in productivity likely resulted in demands for 
additional land to farm. Faced with the prospect of civilian unrest, the Crown would not 
have thought twice before curtailing shepherding privileges. 
The available tithe series do not allow for the construction of a yearly arable output 
indicator for all of Castile.
32 Without such a variable, it is not possible to distinguish 
econometrically between the two possible motives behind the variation in privilege 
enforcement. The timing of the two surges in licenses to till around the major tax 
increases of 1575 and 1591 would seem to point to the fiscal motive as the main reason. 
Licenses, however, are only one dimension of privilege enforcement, and the year of 
1591 also happens to coincide with the steepest phase of the downturn in Castilian 
agriculture. Most likely both factors, fiscal pressures and social peace, had a role in 
shaping the policies of the Crown. Since both of them worked in complementary ways, it 
is not critical to identify their precise contribution. What matters to show that the 
mechanism at work can be construed as a second-best institutional arrangement is that 
public policy was responsive to economic changes. 
Data and identification 
The econometric analysis in Table 4 provides evidence in support of the second-best 
argument. Its two sets of regressions use appellate lawsuits and licenses to till as outcome 
                                                 
32 The tithes assessed on production volumes were local taxes collected by ecclesiastical institutions. Most 
of them were farmed out to "diezmeros" in exchange for fixed payments, thus eliminating any useful 
variation in the series (Casey 1999, pp. 51-52). Other series are only reported at decadal intervals (e.g. 
García Sanz, 1977). While we have a number of series that allow to reconstruct the assessed quantities (e.g. 
Díez Sanz, 1995), their places of origin cannot be considered representative of all of Castile. Finally, most 
tithe series begin between 1582 and 1585, overlapping for too short a period with the rest of my data.  36 
variables. These measures of privilege enforcement are regressed on prices of fine wool 
deflated by an index of traded goods prices. Since crops weight heavily on the index, and 
since wool prices are not included in it, the resulting price series is a good indicator of the 
comparative advantage of the Mesta’s output. 
The number of entregador rulings is used as a measure of the vigor with which the Mesta 
tried to defend its privileges. Because the number of rulings is reported at five-year 
intervals by Marín Barriguete, I constructed a yearly estimate by interpolating the 
quinquennial figures using a linear trend.
33 
Two additional controls, the volume of wool exports through the northern ports and the 
total expenditures of the Crown, are included for robustness. Most of Castile’s wool 
production was exported; while the kingdom was a large enough player not to be a price-
taker in the market, it is well established that the decline in prices in the second half of 
the sixteenth century responded to external factors, chief among them the war in the 
Netherlands and the emergence of the Nouvelles Draperies, technologically engineered to 
take advantage of British wool.
34 It is hence quite unlikely that changes in the 
institutional environment would have been the main reason behind the worsening 
conditions in the fine wool industry; if a causal link existed, it must have operated in the 
inverse direction. The volume of exports can thus be considered a reasonably exogenous 
variable capturing the quantity dimension of the fine wool market. 
                                                 
33 My interpolation procedure smoothes out identifying variation, and is akin to introducing a broken time 
trend informed by the available observations. This will introduce attenuation bias, potentially reducing the 
significance of the estimates. The coefficients on the export variable are indeed insignificant in my 
regressions. The likelihood of attenuation bias should be kept in mind when interpreting them. 
34 Munro (2005) provides an excellent treatment of the evolution of the Spanish wools, their use by the 
Dutch textile industry, and the negative impact of the emergence of the Nouvelles Draperies on Castile’s 
exports. 37 
Data on wool exports are from Casado Alonso (1994), expressed in thousands of sacks of 
wool.
35 Export data are only available until 1585, with two missing values in 1574 and 
1584 imputed through linear interpolation. A concern arises because, while Casado 
Alonso's data only cover shipments through the northern ports, data on customs revenue 
suggest that exports through the Mediterranean ports were at least of a similar 
magnitude.
36 Unfortunately, a number of problems with the customs data render them 
unusable as a proxy for quantities exported. First, they are only available between 1558 
and 1582, already a short period. Second, between 1567 and 1572, the southern customs 
were farmed out in exchange for fixed payments, effectively eliminating any variation in 
the series. Finally, differential tax rates by destination were introduced in 1566, making it 
impossible to convert revenues to quantities without knowing the destination of exports.
37 
Despite the unsuitability of tax revenue data to generate yearly export estimates for the 
southern ports, the total amount collected should at least be loosely correlated with the 
order of magnitude of the quantities exported. Figure 6 shows the revenue from wool 
export duties generated at the southern ports, deflated by an index of Andalusian traded 
good prices. 
                                                 
35 The exact quantity of wool in a sack is uncertain. Grafe (2001, fn. 46) provides an excellent discussion 
on the subject, pointing to a best estimate of about 80 kilograms (slightly over 7 arrobas) per sack. 
36 The following analysis relies on revenue data for the Nuevo Derecho de las Lanas from Ulloa (1977, ch. 
9). This tax was introduced in 1558 to extract more revenue from wool exports, which had until then only 
been taxed as the same rate as other commodities through the Diezmos de la Mar. 
37 Exports to the Low Countries paid 1.5 ducat per sack, while exports to other destinations paid 4 ducats 
per sack. However, in the southern ports exports to France were assessed only 2 ducats (Ulloa, 1977). 38 
Figure 6: Customs revenue on wool exports from the southern ports, 
in millions of 1601-1610 maravedíes 
 
Source: Ulloa (1977, ch. 9); Drelichman (2005). 
Apart from the discrete jump of the mid-1560s, caused by a change in tax rates, and one 
peak in 1578, the series is fairly stable. It is therefore likely that quantities exported 
through the southern ports hovered within the same order of magnitude during this 
period. If that were the case, then most of the variation in total exports would originate 
from the northern port series, which suffered a dramatic decline. For the purposes of 
econometric identification, which relies on variation rather than on levels, it is then still 
appropriate to use the northern exports series. Since the export data overlap with price 
data for just 28 years, the second and third regressions in each set drop the exports 
variable to allow for a longer period of analysis. 39 
The identifying source of variation in the analysis is the exogenous decline in demand for 
Mesta wool. This implies that the export and price variables will be positively correlated, 
roughly following the supply curve. As long as they are not also correlated with the error 
term, this positive correlation between the regressors will not affect the consistency of 
OLS. In the absence of multicollinearity, and with heteroskedasticity properly controlled, 
the estimates should be efficient as well. 
The expenditures of the Crown are used to introduce the fiscal dimension. While revenue 
would perhaps be a more appropriate variable, it is hard to make the argument that Crown 
revenue was completely independent of changes in the property rights environment. 
Expenditure, on the other hand, was largely exogenous. During the reign of Philip II, 
expenditures were chiefly determined by the military situation on the battlefield. With the 
exception of a few years in which he was excluded from capital markets by the lenders, 
the king usually enjoyed plentiful access to credit. This allowed him to react to 
expenditure demands without worrying about his short-run sources of income 
(Drelichman and Voth, 2007). Although in the long run fiscal constraints came to bind in 
the form of bankruptcy and lending shortages, the yearly frequency used here is unlikely 
to suffer from endogeneity between expenditure and privilege enforcement. In any case, 
the coefficients are essentially unchanged if revenue is used instead of expenditure. The 
fiscal data, expressed in millions of ducats deflated by a Castilian price index, is from 
Drelichman and Voth (2007). Revenue and expenditure data are only available for the 
period 1566-1596. Appendix A reproduces all the data used in the regression analysis, 
while Appendix C compares the results in table 4 with those obtained using three 
alternative deflators.  40 
Table 4: Determinants of privilege enforcement. 
    Dependent variable is appellate lawsuits    Dependent variable is licenses to till 
    1558-1585  1558-1600  1566-1596    1558-1585  1558-1600  1566-1596 












exports    -0.116*** 
(-2.94) 
      -0.359*** 
(-3.94) 
   












expenditure        -0.172 
(-0.44) 
      -1.390 
(-0.81) 












                 
Prob > F    0.003  0.000  0.001    0.000  0.001  0.008 
R
2    0.41  0.17  0.18    0.72  0.31  0.39 
DW    2.06  1.72  1.96    1.71  1.41  1.77 
N    28  43  31    28  43  31 
For data sources see the text and Appendix A. OLS regressions with Newey-West standard errors. Figures 
in parenthesis are t-statistics. Stars denote significance levels as follows: * = 10%, **=5%, ***=1%.  
Interpretation 
The regressions in Table 4 show that prices of fine wool were negatively related to the 
level of enforcement of Mesta privileges. The effects are always significant at the 1% 
level, and their magnitudes are large. An increase of 100 constant maravedíes in the price 
of an arroba of unwashed wool (equivalent to 25% of the average price for the 1558-1600 
period) was associated with a fall of between 5.6 and 8.4 licenses per year depending on 
the model. This is equivalent to between 30% and 45% of the average number of 
licenses. Similarly, and increase of 100 constant maravedíes in the price of wool was 
associated with a fall of between 1 and 1.5 appellate lawsuits per year – once again 41 
between 30% and 45% of the average number of lawsuits in the sample during the 
period.
38  
Exports are also negatively related to privilege enforcement. While the significance level 
is strong, the magnitude of the effect is not very large. An increase in 1,000 sacks of wool 
exported, equivalent to 10% of average yearly exports, was associated with a drop of only 
0.12 lawsuits, or 0.36 licenses. These movements are quite small, indicating that most of 
the political response to market conditions is captured through the price effect. This result 
is convenient, as lengthening the period of analysis beyond 1585 requires dropping the 
exports variable due to its limited temporal coverage. The small magnitude of its 
coefficient ensures that the omitted variable bias from doing so will not be large. 
The number of entregador rulings is never significant when appellate lawsuits is the 
dependent variable, and it is only significant at the 10% level when licenses are used. 
Even then, it has the wrong sign, as increases in entregador rulings are associated with 
more licenses to till. If the Mesta was hoping to reduce the encroachment of agriculture 
on its rights of pasturage by issuing more rulings, its actions seem to have been 
inconsequential at best.
39 Alternatively, the positive sign might indicate that rulings had 
some relationship to the enforcement variables. The low statistical significance of the 
coefficient on rulings, as well as the regression in Table 3, however, lend little support to 
this interpretation. Finally the inclusion of expenditure or revenue (not reported) does not 
                                                 
38 On a technical note, it must be kept in mind that the lawsuits data comes from a 25% random sample of 
the population. While the percentage effects remain unaltered by this, the results must be multiplied by four 
to obtain the estimated effect on total lawsuits. 
39 In the regressions reported in Table 4 I used the contemporaneous number of entregador rulings as an 
independent variable. Replacing it with the first lag of rulings does not change the coefficients on any of 
the variables and, in most cases, reduces the statistical significance of rulings even further. However, since 
this variable was obtained using an interpolation procedure, the likelihood of attenuation bias must be kept 
in mind. 42 
yield statistically significant coefficients on these variables, but it does increase the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the price of wool. This suggests that 
property rights were not altered as a direct response to fiscal motives. Rather, the 
restriction of the Mesta’s privileges through licenses and lawsuits followed only the 
change in the comparative advantage of its main output relative to other tradable goods. 
Wool prices, therefore, hold the highest explanatory power in accounting for the variation 
in the enforcement of Mesta privileges. Prices inversely reflect the opportunity cost of 
keeping land as pasture rather than in arable production. As external demand for Mesta 
wool (and hence its prices) fell, towns found it optimal to switch land from pasture to 
arable; and as agriculture started to favor more extensive farming, the opportunity cost of 
pasture rose as well. In a first best scenario, the reallocation of land would have been 
achieved through the market, but the several forms of rent control in favor of the Mesta 
dampened the signals conveyed by prices. Had its privileges been perfectly enforced, the 
Mesta could have always re-rented the same plots at the same price regardless of market 
pressures. If shepherds gave up their rent controlled plots and the price of wool went up 
again, they would have faced the prospect of having to bid for the plots again in the 
future, at higher rents. Allowing land to be reallocated required either revoking those 
privileges or loosening their enforcement. Implementing a best-practice scenario would 
have required eliminating a large number of centuries-old privileges, an unlikely move in 
a Medieval legal framework. More importantly, in light of the hold-up problems that 
confronted transhumance, removing the privileges altogether was not desirable either. 
Varying the levels of legal enforcement is clearly not a first-best practice, as it introduces 
uncertainty and is subject to arbitrary behavior. The data presented here, however, 43 
suggest that it worked reasonably well as a second best institutional arrangement, 
aligning the allocation of resources with the evolution of their social cost. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Merino wool truly was, in the words of Carla and William Phillips, Spain’s golden fleece. 
The Mesta emerged in the late Middle Ages as perhaps the first national organization in 
the kingdom of Castile, which was then still battling for political and military supremacy 
in the peninsula. Its internal regulation and effective bargaining with the Crown 
successfully solved the hold-up problems faced by long-distance transhumance. The 
monarchs secured a source of revenue and a presence in newly conquered lands, while 
Castilian shepherds and flock owners were able to realize their comparative advantage 
and supply the textile industry of Western Europe with one of its finest raw materials. 
The careful study of archival sources that fed the recent historiography on the Mesta has 
largely put to rest the image of a rent-seeking organization indulged with anachronistic 
privileges by a revenue-hungry Crown. The indictment that would have held the Mesta 
almost single-handedly responsible for the Castilian stagnation of the seventeenth century 
and beyond has followed a similar fate. The reconstructions of Marín Barriguete and 
García Sanz, among others, made it clear that the Mesta’s privileges were only 
selectively enforced by the Royal justice system. It nonetheless remained unclear which 
factors were behind the varying level of enforcement and, by extension, the relationship 
between shepherding privileges and economic efficiency in Early Modern Castile. 
This paper has argued that the privileges of the Mesta are best understood as a case of 
second-best institutional arrangements. In the absence of an efficient market for land, 
broad rights of passage and pasturage coupled with selective enforcement offered the 44 
next best alternative to allow resources to flow towards their most efficient uses. The 
empirical analysis shows that the level of enforcement varied inversely with the price of 
wool, itself determined by largely exogenous factors in international markets. The 
relationship survives controlling for the Mesta’s reaction through entregador rulings, 
which proved ineffective. Most tellingly, the inclusion of fiscal variables shows no 
relationship with the level of privilege enforcement once the effect of market conditions 
is accounted for. It was the variation in the efficiency of each sector alone that ultimately 
determined the change in the amount of resources available to transhumant shepherds 
relative to what farmers and towns could keep for themselves.
40 Since property rights 
were being modified in a way consistent with the evolution of relative comparative 
advantage, it is hard to maintain the view that the supposedly asphyxiating privileges 
were damaging the Castilian economy.
41  
The nature and mode of operation of the royal bureaucracy places limits on the depth of 
the analysis. Courts did not justify their rulings and the text of licenses did not transcend 
the formulaic. These documents therefore contain no information on the mechanisms 
behind the changes in property rights. It is possible that the shift in comparative 
advantage allowed the newly favored sectors to lobby the Crown and the courts more 
effectively. The Crown itself, searching for additional revenue, might have decided to 
favor the sectors with a stronger productive capability. The agricultural downturn and 
                                                 
40 The regression framework is silent on the efficient level of resources allocated to each activity. It is 
possible that shepherding interests always had too many, or too few, resources. 
41 There were two potential transmission channels. The Crown might have curtailed the Mesta’s privileges 
in a bid to extract more revenue from local towns (an interpretation supported by the timing of the spikes in 
the series of licenses to till), or it might have been pursuing social peace at a time of local food shortages. 
While the econometric specification cannot distinguish between them in the absence of further data, both of 
them are compatible with modifying property rights in favor of the sector that had increased its 
comparative advantage. 45 
local food shortages of the late sixteenth century, on their part, would have certainly put 
additional pressure on the formulation of public policy. Fully understanding these micro-
dynamics of property rights allocation will require more detailed documentation than the 
archives have offered so far. 
This reinterpretation of the role of the Mesta is encompassed in a growing literature that 
has made strong inroads in unbundling the black box of institutions in Early Modern 
Europe.
42 The particular application of the theory of the second best developed here, 
adapted from the policy literature, introduces a novel approach to the complex 
relationship between governing bodies and economic stakeholders in the context of 
market incompleteness. The combination of these two strands of work suggest a path for 
furthering our understanding of institutional evolution in the Early Modern period, as 
well as for informing current policy debates. 
APPENDIX A: DATA 
The following table lists the data used in the regressions presented in tables 3, 4 and 5. The 
complete dataset, including the source data for all figures, can be downloaded from 
http://mauricio.econ.ubc.ca/data/Mesta_data.xls 
The units and sources are as follows: 
Prices of wool (in 1601-1610 maravedíes per arroba): Archivo de la Diputación Provincial 
de Sevilla, Misericordia, Libros 108-114. The deflator is the Andalusian traded goods 
index from Drelichman (2005), using a 1601-1610 base. The values for 1567, 1570 and 
1574 are interpolated linearly. 
Exports (in thousands of sacks of wool): Casado Alonso (1994). The values for 1574 and 
1584 are interpolated linearly. 
Licenses (in number per year): Marín Barriguete (1987). 
Lawsuits (in number per year): Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid. Pleitos 
Civiles. Fernando Alonso, (F) and (O); Pleitos Civiles. Pérez Alonso, (F) and (O). 
                                                 
42 See, among others, Epstein (2000), Greif (2006), Drelichman (2007), and Gelderblom and Grafe (2007). 46 
Rulings (in number per year): Marín Barriguete (1987). Data are reported at five year 
intervals in the original source. I divided each observation by five, assigned the resulting 
value to the year in the middle of the corresponding period, and interpolated the 
remaining values linearly. 
Expenditure (in millions of 1555 ducats): Drelichman and Voth (2007). 
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Year  Price  Exports  Licenses  Lawsuits  Rulings  Expenditure 
1558  412.34  31.498  4  0  8   
1559  487.16  14.706  3  1  8.92   
1560  463.03  13.21  8  1  9.84   
1561  533.21  20.085  7  1  10.76   
1562  495.72  11.044  5  0  11.68   
1563  508.03  18.946  4  1  12.6   
1564  664.78  16.142  3  1  12.08   
1565  703.45  10.471  0  2  11.56   
1566  689.00  13.539  4  0  11.04  2.171 
1567  565.55  16.423  1  1  10.52  2.998 
1568  442.10  11.426  3  0  10  2.639 
1569  473.26  6.194  3  0  10.68  2.446 
1570  490.73  15.801  7  0  11.36  2.442 
1571  508.19  12.121  2  4  12.04  2.805 
1572  613.77  8.045  5  2  12.72  3.752 
1573  551.99  2.647  9  2  13.4  2.758 
1574  553.53  2.416  8  1  11.8  3.607 
1575  555.06  2.186  6  3  10.2  4.978 
1576  452.77  1.101  8  1  8.6  4.946 
1577  349.08  2.78  11  4  7  4.901 
1578  375.75  3.78  23  7  5.4  4.187 
1579  364.69  4.226  23  4  7.28  3.796 
1580  402.87  4.895  14  3  9.16  4.355 
1581  396.89  4.155  24  8  11.04  3.649 
1582  330.65  3.04  25  1  12.92  4.224 
1583  279.63  3.958  22  7  14.8  4.605 
1584  270.67  5.488  36  5  16.84  3.670 
1585  401.53  7.018  21  11  18.88  3.746 
1586  453.67    30  8  20.92  3.620 
1587  408.69    14  4  22.96  7.259 
1588  367.20    25  16  25  3.733 
1589  259.74    17  5  30.48  5.196 
1590  241.97    34  6  35.96  4.671 
1591  296.73    134  6  41.44  4.598 
1592  337.02    55  8  46.92  3.639 
1593  298.56    35  1  52.4  4.308 
1594  329.80    45  5  52.6  3.505 
1595  369.87    29  2  52.8  7.074 
1596  360.63    14  3  53  3.500 
1597  357.08    23  0  53.2   
1598  300.16    15  2  53.4   
1599  269.62    17  4  48.88   
1600  303.13    6  2  44.36   
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APPENDIX B: THE EFFECT OF AN INCREASE IN THE FRIENDLINESS OF THE 
COURTS TOWARDS AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS 
Let 
€ 
f ∈ 0, 1 [ ] denote the friendliness of the Chancery Courts towards local interests, and 
let 
€ 
q ∈ 0, 1 [ ] denote the intrinsic merits (quality) of a given case. If the case is brought to 
the court, its probability of being successful is p=q f. 
Assume that all complaints against the Mesta cost the same to fight in court, and offer the 
same payoff to the winner. This is without loss of generality as long as the relationship 
between cost and payoff is strictly positive; to generalize the argument, just repeat the 
analysis for each category of cases, where a category is defined as a cost-benefit pair. 
Denoting the cost of fighting a lawsuit by C and the payoff to winning by Π, a risk-
neutral landlord or village having a complaint against the Mesta will only appeal to the 
Royal Chancery Court if 
€ 
pΠ≥ C. 
For any given distribution of the quality of lawsuits, the percentage of potential litigants 
that actually choose to file an appeal is given by 
€ 
Pr Πp ≥ C ( ) = Pr Πq f ≥ C ( ) = Pr q≥ C/Π f ( ). Hence the percentage of cases actually 
appealed to the Royal Chancery Courts unambiguously increases with f, the friendliness 
of the courts towards local interests. 
To obtain an expression for the effect of an increase in f on ex-post win rates, it is 
necessary to assume a specific distribution for q, the quality of the cases. Distributions 
with a declining density (implying that there are relatively more ambiguous cases than 
clear cut ones) will generate offsetting effects on win rates. 
As an illustration, assume that the merits of the cases are distributed according to the 
straight-line probability density function 
€ 
f q ( ) = 2− 2q for 
€ 
q ∈ 0, 1 [ ] and 
€ 
f q ( ) = 0 
otherwise. The win rate, w, is the expectation of p conditional on appealing. 
€ 

















The expectation of x conditional on 
€ 
x ≥ k when x is distributed
€ 
f x ( ) = 2− 2x is given by 
€ 
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The first two terms of the derivative are positive, while the third term is negative, 
capturing the offsetting effects of friendlier judges and weaker cases on the win rate. In 
general, if the benefit to cost ratio is not too large and if f is small, the negative effects 
will prevail and win rates will decrease in response to an increase in the friendliness of 
the courts. 
 
APPENDIX C: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Table C1 reproduces the layout of Table 4 in the text. Each cell now reports four 
coefficients (t-statistics are omitted for clarity, but significance levels are reported). The 
four sets of coefficients correspond to regression results where the wool prices have been 
deflated by four different price indices. In each cell, the first value reproduces the one in 
Table 4, which reports results obtained using prices deflated by an index of Andalusian 
traded goods. The remaining three values correspond to results obtained using wool 
prices deflated by price indices of Andalusian non-traded goods, Old Castilian traded 
goods, and Old Castilian non-traded goods respectively. All indices are from Drelichman 
(2005) and can be downloaded from 
http://mauricio.econ.ubc.ca/data/Price_Indices_Moctezuma.xls 
Only the coefficient on exports changes substantially in all three alternative regressions 
with respect to the original one. In column 1, the coefficient increases by as much as 
60%, while in column 4 it almost doubles. Because the economic impact represented by 
the coefficient is very small, even a doubling of its magnitude does not imply a change in 
the interpretation of the results. 
The only other change worthy of note is that of the coefficient on price in columns 3 and 
6, which increases markedly in absolute value when the Andalusian non-traded goods 
index is used (third coefficient in each cell). If the Andalusian non-traded goods index 
were the correct deflator, the result would provide even stronger support for my 
argument.  50 
Table C1: Sensitivity of results to the choice of deflator. 
    Dependent variable is appellate lawsuits    Dependent variable is licenses to till 
    1558-1585  1558-1600  1566-1596    1558-1585  1558-1600  1566-1596 
price 
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N    28  43  31    28  43  31 
Data are from the same sources as in Table 4. OLS regressions with Newey-West standard errors. Stars 







España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid. Valladolid, 
Spain. Sections: Pleitos Civiles. Fernando Alonso, (F) and (O); Pleitos Civiles. Pérez 
Alonso, (F) and (O). 
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